Signcryption tag-KEM (Key Encapsulation Mechanism with a tag) is an authenticated tag-KEM for generic construction of hybrid signcryption. Signcryption tag-KEM allows the sender to encapsulate a symmetric key along with a tag so that the receiver can authenticate the sender, the key, and the tag. We present a definition for the security of signcryption tag-KEM which is suitable for a recent signcryption setting. We also present a proof of security for the previous generic construction of hybrid signcryption according to the given definition.
Introduction
Encryption and signature schemes are fundamental cryptographic tools for providing privacy and authenticity, respectively, in the public-key setting. Both privacy and authenticity are simultaneously needed in many applications on ad-hoc network where anyone can freely join or leave the network. This issue seems to be easily solved by composing a signature and encryption. However, it was noticed by [2] that such multi-user setting opens a possibility for some subtle attacks, not presented in the settings of stand-alone signature and encryption. Thus, a simple composition does not necessarily yield desired properties.
A signcryption was introduced by Zheng [8] as a primitive which simultaneously provides both of privacy and authenticity. There are many works of signcryption [2, 7, 6, 3 ]. An et al. [2] addressed proper modeling of signcryption. Then, Dodis et al. [7, 6] modified the definition for security more reasonably in the multi-user setting. Recently, Dent and Bjørstad [3] presented a tag-KEM/DEM framework for generic construction of hybrid signcryption. The original tag-KEM/DEM [1] was introduced for generic construction of hybrid encryption. The framework combines tag-KEM (Key Encapsulation Mechanism with a tag) and DEM (Data Encryption Mechanism). A tag-KEM uses asymmetric technique to encrypt a symmetric key along with a tag, while the DEM uses a symmetric cipher to encrypt the message payload using the key from the KEM.
Dent and Bjørstad [3] defined an authenticated tag-KEM for hybrid signcryption, called signcryption tag-KEM, as a primitive which simultaneously satisfies chosen ciphertext security for privacy and strong existential unforgeability for authenticity. Moreover, they showed that adapting the tag-KEM/DEM construction of hybrid encryption [1] to signcryption yields simpler scheme descriptions and better generic security reductions than the previous works.
However, the security of signcryption tag-KEM is defined for the previous definition for security of signcryption [2] which restricts the adversary so that the adversary is allowed to access de-signcryption oracle (resp. signcryption oracle) for the attacked user but not signcryption oracle (resp. de-signcryption oracle) for the attacked user if the adversary attacks privacy (resp. authenticity). On the other hand, the modified definition [7, 6] allows the adversary to access both oracles, irrespective of whether the adversary is attacking privacy or authenticity (such attack is called simultaneous attack [6] ). This means that the modified definition for security of signcryption becomes stronger than the previous one and the security of signcryption tag-KEM in [3] is not enough strong for yielding the modified security of signcryption. Our Contribution. We define security of signcryption tag-KEM for the modified definition of signcryption [7, 6] which allows simultaneous attacks. Specifically, the adversary is allowed to access all oracles corresponding to signcryption oracle and de-signcryption oracle for the attacked user. When addressing security of signcryption, there are two formalizations. One assumes that the adversary is an outsider who only knows the public information. Such security is called Outsider security. The other, stronger notion, assumes that the adversary is a legal user of the system. Such security is called Insider security. In this paper, we consider the stronger notion, i.e., Insider security. Then, we prove that the new definition for security of signcryption tag-KEM also yields the modified definition for security of signcryption with the same security reductions as in [3] by using the tag-KEM/DEM construction of hybrid signcryption in [3] .
Preliminaries
We review the definitions of signcryption in [7] and DEM in [1] .
Signcryption
Syntax. A signcryption is defined as a three-tuple of polynomial-time algorithms:
• SC.Gen (1 k ), a key generation algorithm, takes as input a security parameter 1 k , and outputs a keypair (sk, pk) where sk is the user's secret key and pk is the user's public key. The public key pk defines all relative spaces, i.e., space for messages denoted by M. Note, that in the signcryption setting all participating parties need to invoke SC.Gen. For a user P , denote its keys by sk P and pk P .
• SEnc(sk S , pk R , m), a signcryption algorithm, takes as input the sender's secret key sk S , the receiver's public key pk R , and a message m. It returns a signcryption SC.
• V Dec(sk R , pk S , SC), a de-signcryption algorithm, takes as input the receiver's secret key sk R , the sender's public key pk S , and a signcryption SC.
It outputs a message m or the unique error symbol ⊥ in case SC is "invalid."
Completeness. For any sender S, any receiver R, and any message m ∈ M,
Insider security. Insider-secure signcryption protects a given user U even if his partner might be malicious. For privacy, if honest user S sent a signcryption to U and later exposed his key to the adversary, the adversary still cannot decrypt the signcryption. For authenticity, without U 's secret key, the adversary cannot forge signcryption from U to another user R, even with R's secret key.
When addressing the security, we deal with two issues: Security goal and attack model. In [7] , for privacy and authenticity, a common type of security goal and attack model is considered, called indistinguishability (IND)/strong existential unforgeability (abbreviated as sUF, sEUF, or sEF) and chosen ciphertext attack (CCA2)/chosen message attack (CMA), respectively. We denote the resulting security notion by IND-CCA2/sUF-CMA. The notation follows [2, 7, 3] .
The security IND-CCA2 requires that any probabilistic polynomial time adversary should be unable to find any pair (m 0 , m 1 ) for which he can distinguish SEnc(sk S , pk U , m 0 ) from SEnc(sk S , pk U , m 1 ), with adaptive access to the following two oracles for the attacked user U corresponding to each of SEnc and V Dec.
• O SE , the signcryption oracle, takes as input any user's (receiver's) public key pk and any message m. It returns SEnc(sk U , pk, m),
• O V D , the de-signcryption oracle, takes as input any user's (sender's) public key pk, a signcryption SC, and a message m. It returns V Dec(sk U , pk, SC, m).
Allowing access to oracle O SE is a main difference from the previous definition [2] .
To create "valid" signcryptions that the adversary must distinguish between, he outputs the secret key sk S of the user S sending messages to U . This means that even when compromising S, the adversary is still unable to understand messages S sent to U . Let A SC,cca be a probabilistic polynomial time oracle machine that plays the following game. 
. We say that a signcryption is cca -IND-CCA2-secure if for any probabilistic polynomial time adversary
The security sUF-CMA requires that any probabilistic polynomial time adversary should not only be able to generate a "valid" signcryption SC of some message m from U to any user R, with adaptive access to the above two oracles. Allowing access to oracle O V D is a main difference from the previous definition [2] . In order to define "valid," the adversary is allowed to come up with the presumed secret key sk R as part of his forgery. Let A SC,cma be a probabilistic polynomial time oracle machine that plays the following game.
Step (ii), A SC,cma is restricted not to obtain SC in response to any O SE query.
A SC,cma is considered successful only if V Dec(sk R , pk U , SC) = ⊥. We define the advantage of the adversary as the probability it succeeds. We say that a signcryption is cma -sUF-CMA-secure if for any probabilistic polynomial time adversary A SC,cma , the advantage Adv A SC,cma (1
DEM
Syntax. A DEM is defined as a tuple of two polynomial-time algorithms (Enc, Dec) associated to (symmetric) key-space K D defined by the security parameter k. We consider K D is {0, 1} Security. For the purposes of this paper, we only require passive security for DEM as [3] . Let A D be a probabilistic polynomial time machine that plays the following game.
We define the advantage of the adversary A D as Adv
We say that DEM is D -one-time secure if for any probabilistic polynomial time adversary
New Definition for Insider Security
We now define the notion of Insider security for signcryption tag-KEM. In the previous model of signcryption tag-KEM in [3] , the sender's key and the receiver's key are generated by different algorithms while in a general model of signcryption the keys are generated by the same algorithm. We follow the general model of signcryption.
Syntax of Signcryption Tag-KEMs
A signcryption tag-KEM is defined as a four-tuple of polynomial-time algorithms:
• SCT K.Gen (1 k ), a key generation algorithm, takes as input a security parameter 1 k , and outputs a pair of keys (sk, pk) where sk is the user's secret key and pk the user's public key. The public key pk defines all relative spaces, i.e., spaces for tags and encapsulated keys denoted by T and K K , respectively.
• Sym(sk S , pk R ), a symmetric key generation algorithm, takes as input the secret key of the sender sk S and the public key of the receiver pk R . It outputs a symmetric key K ∈ K D together with internal state information ω where K D is the key space of DEM.
• SEncap(ω, τ ), a key encapsulation algorithm, takes as input the state information ω and an arbitrary tag τ . It returns an encapsulation E.
• V Decap(sk R , pk S , E, τ ), a decapsulation algorithm, takes as input the receiver's secret key sk R , the sender's public key pk S , an encapsulation E, and a tag τ . It outputs a symmetric key K or the unique error symbol ⊥ in case E is "invalid."
Completeness. For any sender S, any receiver R, and any tag τ ∈ T , if
Insider Security of Signcryption tag-KEM
The definition for Insider security of signcryption and signcryption tag-KEM in [3] neither mention nor allow simultaneous attacks. Therefore, we define the notion of Insider security so that the adversary has access to all oracles associated with not only O SE but also O V D .
We consider IND/sUF and CCA2/CMA as security goal and attack model, respectively. We denote the resulting security notion by IND-CCA2/sUF-CMA.
The security IND-CCA2 requires that any probabilistic polynomial time adversary should be unable to distinguish whether a given K is the one embedded in an encapsulation (E, τ ) or not, with adaptive access to three oracles for the attacked user U corresponding to each of Sym, SEncap, and V Decap.
• O S , the symmetric key generation oracle, takes as input any user's (receiver's) public key pk, runs Sym(sk U , pk), and obtains (K, ω). It then stores the value ω (hidden from the view of the adversary, and overwriting any previously stored values), and returns the symmetric key K.
• O E , the key encapsulation oracle, takes as input an arbitrary tag τ , and checks whether there exists a stored value ω. If there is not, it returns ⊥ and terminates. Otherwise it erases the value from storage, and returns SEncap(ω, τ ).
• O D , the key decapsulation oracle, takes as input any user's (sender's) public key pk, an encapsulation E, and a tag τ . It returns V Decap(sk U , pk, E, τ ). To create "valid" encapsulations that the adversary must distinguish between, he outputs the secret key sk S of the user S embedding a key for U same as the adversary against signcryption in [7] . This means that even when compromising S, the adversary is still unable to understand keys S embedded for U . Let A SCT K,cca be a probabilistic polynomial time oracle machine that plays the following game. . The security sUF-CMA requires that any probabilistic polynomial time adversary should not be able to generate a "valid" encapsulation E from U to any user R, with adaptive access to the three oracles. Allowing access to oracle O D is a main difference from the previous definition [3] . In order to define "valid," we also allow the adversary to come up with the presumed secret key sk R as part of his forgery same as the adversary against signcryption in [7] . Let A SCT K,cma be a probabilistic polynomial time oracle machine that plays the following game.
Step (ii), A SCT K,cma is restricted not to obtain E from a query to O E . A SCT K,cma is considered successful only if V Decap(sk R , pk U , E, τ ) = ⊥. We define the advantage Adv A SCT K,cma (1 k ) as the probability A SCT K,cma succeeds. We say that a signcryption tag-KEM is cma -sUF-CMA-secure if for any probabilistic polynomial time adversary
Generic Construction of Hybrid Signcryption and Its Security Proof
We review the generic construction of hybrid signcryption in [3] , and prove that the new definition for security of signcryption tag-KEM yields the modified definition for security of signcryption in [7] .
Generic Construction of Hybrid Signcryption
The construction is based on the same idea of the generic construction of hybrid asymmetric encryption proposed in [1] .
Proof of the Security
We now turn to proving security of the hybrid signcryption scheme. The proof is almost the same as the one for the previous definition for security. We present here the proof for the IND-CCA2 security. The IND-CCA2 security of hybrid signcryption is proven in the same way as the IND-CCA2 security of hybrid encryption in [1] .
Proof. Let Game 0 be the regular IND-CCA2 game for signcryption. 
Conclusion
We have presented the security notion for signcryption tag-KEM and proven security of the previous construction of hybrid signcryption according to the given definition. One of the future works is to present a construction of optimal signcryption tag-KEM.
